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Abstract:  Merrifield (2009) provides a useful polemic about the sad state of data analysis too 
frequently encountered in the school choice literature.  The available data come mostly from 
limited policy experiments with only modest amounts of choice and competition.  These data are 
then misapplied in debates about more dramatic shifts to new systems to supply educational 
services that aim for large expansions of choice and competition.  It is difficult to cleanly 
separate theoretical priors from empirical evidence.  I contend that it is possible to make a 
stronger empirical case for dramatic school reform.  But doing so would require dealing with six 
potential pitfalls based on economic theory that might arise when attempting to move to school 
systems more reliant on private providers of educational services.  Given the difficulty of policy 
experiments, this is a high evidential bar, and may leave us stuck in an unfortunate status quo, as 
Merrifield suggests.  More detailed definitions of competition together with bold, new empirical 
evidence are clear priorities for advancing debates over school reform, and should be core 
elements of prescriptive policy analysis. 
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What Does Competition Mean? 
Merrifield points out that different sides in school choice debates too frequently rely on 
badly defined notions of “competition.” He is surely correct that these debates would benefit 
from more clarity about the many empirical manifestations of competition, or lack of it, and the 
extent to which the school choice initiatives studied actually increase choice and competition.   
Merrifield emphasizes weakness in the arguments of opponents of school reform who 
base their opposition on the lack of large, measurable improvements in educational outcomes in 
empirical studies of school reform initiatives.  The weakness, Merrifield explains, is that these 
school reform initiatives that produced few impressive improvements were very minor initiatives 
that did not dramatically expand competition or consumer choice for educational services.  If all 
our reform attempts are timid and achieve very little additional range of choice in K-12 
education, then one would not expect dramatic shifts in school performance as a result. 
  In the case of policy experiments with voucher programs, for example, there are still 
stringent rules for how schools can qualify to be able to accept vouchers.  There are sometimes 
price controls written into the laws calling for voucher experiments that restrict how much 
schools made eligible to accept vouchers can charge.  And, in some cases, political connections 
between lawmakers and the suppliers of private school services waiting to enter the market 
following passage of reform legislation may become too close, leading to a handoff of the 
educational monopoly from the state to favored supplier.   
These forces might make education “markets” look very different from those idealized in 
economics textbooks under the label “perfect competition.”  Still, it is a serious question to ask 
what we mean when we say and write the word, competition.   If the world has seen few, if any, 
markets for educational services that come close to approaching reasonable measures of 
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competitiveness (e.g., low levels of market concentration, large number of suppliers, or price 
nearly equal to marginal cost, etc.), then obviously it is unfair to argue that whenever we have 
tried “competitive school supply,” it fails to achieve better results.   
The right answer is that we do not know what a dramatic policy change aimed at large-
scale expansion of competition and choice would look like.  Would a genuinely competitive 
educational services market emerge?  We do not know, because it has never been tried—perhaps 
with good reason, or perhaps because of an unfortunate persistence or lock-in of the status quo. 
 
Does More Empiricism Mean Less Theory?  
Given an insufficient observational basis to argue in favor of any policy that has never 
been tried before, advocates for policy change almost necessarily face the daunting task of using 
both theory and empirics to formulate convincing arguments.  Merrifield’s critique of “imagined 
evidence” implicitly exhorts those debating school reform to adhere to a more rigorous empirical 
standard.  More empiricism seems to me like very good advice for the economists and policy 
analysts of all stripes.   
Yet theory persists in informing the arguments and positions we take.  This may be 
unavoidable.  And it may not be all bad.  We leave it for another venue to analyze these 
methodological and philosophical points about whether it is possible or desirable to conduct 
empirical economic analyses without imposing the structure, and underlying assumptions, of an 
economic model. 
But this challenge, which I take to be an entirely admirable and worthwhile goal, of 
relying more heavily on empirical rather than theoretical arguments, makes it difficult to extend 
Merrifield’s critique beyond the absence of good evidence.  We may all share the objective of 
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more strictly tying our arguments to robust empirical scrutiny.  But if we have no data in the 
relevant range (i.e., observations of competitive school supply under an institutional arrangement 
very different from the status quo), then what avenues are there to argue for the new institution?  
Are we trapped, as Merrifield suggests, as an “intellectual prisoner of the status quo”? 
 
Statistical Analogy 
There is an obvious analogy from Statistics 101 about the inadvisability of using a 
regression model to make predictions far outside the range of values covered by the sample used 
to estimate the model.  Suppose we want to predict y conditional on x, where y is a measure of 
educational outcomes, such as schools’ within-school mean test scores, and x is an institutional 
variable ranging from 0 to 100, measuring how competitive the supply side of the educational 
services market is. If Merrifield is right that we have almost no observations of highly 
competitive school markets, then the existing studies are estimating changes in y (educational 
quality) as a function of very small changes in x (ranging, say, from 0 to 5, very far from 
anything resembling competitive school markets).    
Merrifield’s critique of “imagined evidence” used can be interpreted as: just because 
observed values of y do not change much on the range of x between 0 and 5 (where school 
markets remain very far from being competitive), it does not follow that y will not change much 
when x shifts upward toward a perfectly competitive value of 100.   
 
A Weak Empirical Argument Based on Similarity to Support Evidence-Free Theoretical Priors? 
Merrifield’s next line of argument goes well beyond this null result (which, again, is 
correct and worthwhile to point out).  He argues in favor of a much more substantial shift toward 
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privatization of schools, perhaps doing away with public schools, and removing the role of the 
state as much as possible in the supply of educational services.  If we accept his earlier argument 
that there are no good observations of truly competitive school supply, then his second argument 
must be based on theory rather than evidence.   
But he attempts an empirical justification for the policy positions he advocates: “Data 
that could qualify as indirect evidence are plentiful; for example, from competitive industries 
with much in common with schooling.”   
How many competitive industries can you name that have “much in common with 
schooling”? I cannot think of any. 
One private industry that Merrifield mentions is the Japanese cram schools, or juku, that 
offer private tutoring at night and on weekends in Japan.  This industry is surprisingly large, and 
many Japanese children receive private training to help pass school entrance exams.  Adults use 
similar private tutoring services called senmon gakko on a relatively large scale in preparing for 
the challenging written exams used to screen applicants for public sector jobs in Japan. 
In both cases, however, the role of the free market in generating demand is open to 
question, since the motive is to pass an exam whose content is set largely by government entities.  
Absent strict entrance exams whose content is determined by the state, I suspect these “markets” 
would disappear—like the market for passport photos if the U.S. government stopped requiring 
photos on passports.  These private industries operate in an overlay with state rules and 
governmental institutions rather than as spontaneous, self-organized vehicles facilitating 
exchange between private parties.   
I wonder, for example, what a fully competitive education market would provide in the 
way of courses in history.  Would histories that only a few people wanted to consume be sold?  
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Would groups attempt to influence others’ interpretations of history by subsidizing the teaching 
of their preferred histories?  If we let competitive pricing rather than experts granted authority by 
the state (in some capacity) decide which versions of history are taught, would we have achieved 
a rich plurality of distinct views about the past, or a chaotic drop in communication between 
groups with irreconcilable understandings of history?  In the “ideal” case (from the point of view 
of standard supply-demand theory with no externalities) in which every individual was supplied 
the interpretation of history he or she wanted, would we lose the coordination function of that 
shared sense of a national history? 
Merrifield articulates confidence in "the indispensability of market-determined prices as 
sources of vital information and powerful incentives,” advocating for “a gradual elimination of 
public schools."  But the extent to which the market for education is similar to other markets 
(e.g., homogenous commodities traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange) which appear to be 
functioning successfully with the full efficiency gains hypothesized by the neoclassical theory 
remains unclear.  Empirical evidence is not what makes the argument.  Rather, it is economic 
theory.  And this theory faces a number of empirical challenges. 
  For example, recent financial and housing market activity reveals that the public's beliefs, 
psychological frames and emotions should be regarded as fundamental variables in explaining 
market outcomes, capable of moving endogenous variables such as prices and quantities far from 
the predictions of neoclassical equilibrium theory (e.g., Berg, 2008; Berg and Gigerenzer, 2008; 
Berg and Lien, 2005).  Merrifield claims, “It is a well-established fact that in a genuine market 
system, shortages eliminate themselves by initially pushing up prices and hence encouraging 
their expansion and imitation... ."   
7 
 
But what about the U.S. housing market?   Severe and persistent imbalances between 
quantities supplied and demanded do not seem to automatically disappear, and prices do not 
always quickly adjust to re-equilibrate the market.  It is not hard to imagine that markets for 
educational services would be at least as sensitive as housing markets to changes in levels of 
trust, beliefs about future returns, and psychological resistance to sell assets that have lost value.  
One can cite pro-market economists like Vernon Smith who put markets to an empirical 
test, and find that sometimes they work well, and sometimes they don’t.  And sometimes 
individuals with no information at all can be coordinated well by market mechanisms (Gode and 
Sunder, 1993; Becker, 1962).  Such an empirical approach to markets is quite distinct from 
insisting on some conclusions over others in the absence of data. 
  
Similarity Argument in a Regression Model 
One may follow the earlier analogy from statistics further to interpret Merrifield’s 
similarity argument in which, even in the absence of data, an empirical argument is put forward.  
Suppose there are no observations of the pair (x, y) in the range where x > 10, reflecting 
Merrifield’s first argument that few, if any genuinely competitive experiments in school reform 
have to date been undertaken. Merrifield bases his positive claims in favor of privatizing the K-
12 market for educational services by inviting us to consider other pairs of allegedly similar 
variables, y’ and x’, whose relationship appears to be similar to y and x, drawing conclusions on 
the basis of that relationship.  He argues that we should consider other markets with high degrees 
of competitiveness (large x) and high degrees of market performance based on their own 
outcome metrics (large y) as a basis for assuming that there is a strong positive relationship 
between x’ and y’.   On this basis of similarity of (x’, y’) to (x, y), Merrifield argues that we can 
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have faith that the results in educational services markets would be similar.  This strikes me as 
more of a theoretical than an empirical acclaim, however, in tension with his earlier calls for a 
stronger empirical basis in school reform debates.  
 
Six Potential Problems 
In short, the world has seen few, if any, genuine experiments in which the regulatory 
barriers to entry in the “market” for K-12 educational suppliers (e.g., state-mandated 
requirements regarding quality, accessibility, pricing, etc.) were low enough to attract a wide 
variety of firms and, consequently, a wide range of choice for consumers.  Perhaps with good 
reason.  I can think of at least six reasons why spontaneous, self-organized, competitive supply 
of education services might not materialize, even under ideal conditions—or may not be socially 
desirable from the standpoint of most parents who desire education for their children.  I raise 
these potential problems as implications of economic theory that require empirically grounded 
responses from proponents of school reform—and as someone who genuinely wants to see more 
choice and higher quality in schooling. 
 
1 Adjustment Costs to the New Equilibrium 
For competition in school supply to develop and mature, some bad educational products 
would undoubtedly be tested and weeded out in the long run after failing. Failing schools are 
indeed a major reason for researchers to investigate school reform.  Nevertheless, failures much 
larger than those of currently failing schools may be possible.  The potential costs to children 
who receive failing products, both current failures and newly introduced failures, should be 
considered as part of the cost to transition to a new system of school provision.  Rather than 
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focusing exclusively on the benefits of moving to a new long-run equilibrium, the transition 
costs along the path to that new equilibrium should be part of the policy discussion.   
Again, this plays into what Merrifield refers to as the imprisoning nature of the status 
quo.  A relevant example might be privatization of state assets in Russia in the early 1990s.  The 
competitive markets of neoclassical theory did not instantaneously appear in Russia.  And a 
significant number of older and lower-income Russians’ standard of living fell significantly.  
Thus, even if we generally agree that the overall transition is positive and welfare-enhancing, we 
can expect that educational outcomes might very well get worse for many families before they 
get better under a dramatic shift toward private education.   
 
2 Food Safety as an Analogy for Laissez Faire School Policy? 
Food regulation enjoys broad support among American voters, including many 
conservatives who generally favor de-regulation.  Some producers who benefit from government 
credentialing services (e.g., USDA labels indicating the quality of meat) also might resist shifting 
toward an entirely laissez faire food policy. It is conceivable if not probable that there is 
widespread support for regulation of quality standards in education, too.  This implies another 
theoretical problem. 
If voters largely agree on legislating educational requirements (i.e., a core set of 
standardized skills that we want all schools to achieve), it could be that these desired 
requirements are so stringent that very few firms could profitably enter.  A preference for 
regulating quality might shrink the field of firms who have pedagogical technologies that can 
profitably supply the market.  In that case, our efforts to privatize could lead to a highly 
concentrated and uncompetitive educational services industry.   
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One need only look at market concentration in the meatpacking industry and the 
homogeneity that characterizes the vast majority of meat production in the U.S.   It is not clear 
that the quality standards we require will interface well with suppliers’ technology sets in a way 
that produces great heterogeneity of services and or even enough competitive pressure to avoid 
the large inefficiencies of monopolistic production.  I think we need a strong empirical case to 
support the contention that school reform policies can achieve significant expansions of genuine 
school choice. 
 
3  Geographical Proximity: Is School Competition Feasible without Extremely High Population 
Density? 
Another potential theoretical problem concerns population density and physical 
proximity to schools, which may be among the most important variables in many parents’ school 
choice decisions.  It is not inconceivable that some parents may even have lexicographic 
preferences that prioritize geographic proximity over all other factors, and that no amount of 
additional school quality could compensate for an additional 10 miles of commute distance.  
Insofar as schools’ locations are a key input in school choice, one would expect 
monopolistic competition, at best, and monopolistic power of nearly unlimited scope at worst.  
Consumers of educational services in low-density areas of the country might benefit the least 
from a move toward decentralized market-based supply of schooling services.   
But maybe not.  We need more empirics on this point, with special attention to the spatial 
component of the educational services markets we envision emerging as a result of reform 
policies.  The debate might benefit from breaking out predicted outcomes following policy 
change separately for low-density and high-density residents.   
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A related point concerns Tiebout competition.  If the “residents will vote with their feet” 
hypothesis is used as a theoretical rebuttal of this point, then it begs the question of why that 
competitive pressure does not already produce high-quality competitive results within the public 
system as school districts “compete” for state revenue based on headcounts of enrolled students.  
In some parts of the existing public system, it could be that this mechanism is already realizing 
high degrees of efficiency.  More empirics on this point would add greatly to school choice 
debates. 
 
4 Would the Coordination Function of Public Education Survive Privatization?  
Standardized conventions facilitate technical and scientific communication and, 
doubtlessly, contribute positively to many firms’ production processes.  Theory suggests that 
there is a genuine tension between the gains in terms of expanded choice that could be achieved 
in a more decentralized system versus coordination gains from speaking a common language and 
following a common set of conventions in communication. 
For example, Americans write the decimal representation of the bank entry, “three 
thousand dollars and eighty cents” as 3,000.80, whereas whereas Europeans write it 3.000,80.  
Americans pronounce the variable “z” as “zee” whereas Canadians and British say “zed.”  
Verbal representation of fractions, units of measure, mathematical definitions, and many other 
elements of technical language and shared history vary in different parts of the world as the 
result of different educational institutions.  Although translating from one definitional convention 
to another can be easily accommodated in many cases, potentially high-cost mistakes resulting 
from non-uniformity should be at least considered.  If we moved to a policy of no regulation over 
school curricula, would we introduce new friction costs associated with non-uniform technical 
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conventions?  A thorough empirical argument against centralization of curriculum and core 
curriculum content should, I think, deal with this possibility and the apparent success stories (in 
terms of standardized international tests) of top-performing high school students in relatively 
centralized systems in places such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Finland. 
  
5 The Possibility of Transitioning from State to Private Monopolists 
As a firm believer in competition, I worry a lot about the possibility that, as we move 
toward privatized schools, we might wind up dumping state monopolies for private monopolies 
instead, which might be even more difficult to regulate.  I have listed several reasons, notably 
coordination gains from uniformity in certain limited domains and the problem of natural 
monopolies owing to the importance of physical geography.  Badly aligned incentives of 
politicians overseeing transitions to private school systems are another related concern.  In any 
proposed transition toward greater private provision of schooling, there will be tremendous 
incentives for well-positioned firms wanting to enter the newly de-regulated education market to 
lobby lawmakers to write in special requirements favoring one potential provider over another, 
leading to market power in private as opposed to state controlled hands. 
 
6  Positive Externalities not Captured in Market Prices 
Lastly, it is worth recalling the fundamental economic argument underlying state 
subsidization of education, which is the positive externality that an educated citizen provides to 
other citizens and firms.  Public goods such as a population of fluent speakers of a common 
language, commonly shared sets of technical terms in specialized technical and scientific 
endeavors, and the socialization that occurs in schools, are key inputs in nearly all firms’ 
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production functions (Bowles and Gintis, 2002).  Subsidizing education lowers the costs of 
production to firms.  And insofar as there are synergistic production processes, subsidizing 
education should increase economic growth.   
Of course, subsidizing education does not imply that the state must be the sole supplier of 
those services.  No doubt there exist far less restrictive subsidy policies if legislators wanted to 
reduce regulation while hanging onto the education subsidy.   
 
False Imperatives 
Regarding false imperatives, Merrifield reminds us to use a fair social welfare criterion, 
or outcome measure, when evaluating the effects of reform initiatives.  As Merrifield points out, 
measuring the benefit of competition-expanding programs in terms of their effects on the quality 
of state-supplied schooling unfairly leaves out the benefits to children in private schools.  But 
because many do make the argument that the reason public schools fail is because they have no 
incentive to compete, investigating changes in public school performance after private 
competitors appear does not seem to be an entirely empty question. 
Considering that this essay argues for improved empirical analysis and more careful 
linking of arguments about competition to data, I was surprised at the number of claims in the 
essay that appear to have no empirical support.  That doesn’t mean that the claims are wrong—
just unsupported.  Given the author’s goal, it seems inconsistent to criticize others for arguing 
this way and not provide clearer evidence to support claims, which rest entirely on untested 
theory—importantly, untested in the domain of school choice. 
 
International School Reform Initiatives 
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Merrifield helps us remember that we have much to learn from programs and education-
providing institutions outside the U.S.: 
Half-hearted, partial market liberalization can yield misleading results. For 
example, the ineffectiveness and perverse side effects of presumed market 
reforms slandered capitalism in South America, and with dire consequences 
only now becoming evident in places like Argentina, Venezuela, and Bolivia. 
Because the author seeks more empirical documentation of our positions on school reform, a few 
more details about what aspects of the South American cases prevented genuine competition 
from taking root would have been nice, although Merrifield’s article and books are 
extraordinarily thorough in citing relevant literatures.  
Regarding the New Zealand example, which lacked competitive pricing and allowed 
serious barriers to entry to remain, I wonder if Merrifield is too pessimistic about reforms that 
only modest changes to facilitate particular forms of competition.  In this case, the dimension of 
competition was that public school students could more easily switch schools, with revenue 
consequences for winners and losers in terms of head counts.  Here, economic theory is not 
completely clear in offering predictions.  Theory gives us comparisons of perfect competition 
versus everything else.  The relevant question is whether there is anything like a second best 
(e.g., most efficient school-switching policy subject to the constraint of strict price controls). 
While acknowledging Merrifield’s point that the extent and flavor of competition are 
important to document and vary with greater magnitude shifts in future policy experiments, there 
is nothing in economic theory saying that moderate shifts toward limited forms of competition 
are ineffective or not worth their cost.  One could even make the case that the most successful 
competitive systems benefit from limitations on the dimensions in which competition is allowed.  
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One thinks of the role of the referee in professional basketball.  If brass knuckles, kicking and 
punching were not forbidden in the rules and enforced by referees, then the competitive system 
in professional basketball would produce a very different set of winners, and athletes like 
Michael Jordan would probably not rise to the top in a completely unregulated form of 
basketball.  We depend on the centralized regulation of referees to channel completion along pre-
defined ranges that give us the type of competition that we desire.  
 
Simulation and Uniformity 
Regarding simulation studies as a means of producing new insights about school choice, I 
share Merrifield’s desire to see such studies carried out.  There are daunting empirical challenges 
to carrying it forward, however.  It would be nice if the author specified which parameters that 
cannot be estimated directly from data should be simulated.  Relying on simulation in this way, 
an overarching theoretical model is still required, so that theory may be making as large an 
imprint on our results as empirics:  
Improvements in simulation models, including sensitivity analysis with 
parameters that can’t be estimated from present data, are of the utmost 
importance. That is probably the only way to explore the importance of key 
parent, educator, and entrepreneurial behavior, and the implications of the 
apparent significant diversity in how children learn. 
Merrifield’s discussion of simulation brings up a terrifically important point regarding 
uniformity of schools, and the possible benefits of moving to multiple measures of ability rather 
than singular and universally applied metrics.  Public schools in their current state are hardly 
uniform, as is evidenced by the large role that school quality has in homebuyers’ location 
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choices.  If schools were uniform, then parents would not condition their residential choice 
decisions so heavily on public school attendance zones. 
One-size-fits-all measurement schemes and school curricula obviously drive many 
sincere and creative teachers out of public education.  But many good ones choose to remain, 
which is another indication that the current system is, thankfully, not completely uniform, 
and that financial incentives alone cannot explain who becomes a teacher and who remains in 
the profession.  
 
Conclusion 
Merrifield’s admonitions about imagined evidence are very welcome: “The actual 
competitiveness of the settings studied to gauge ‘market competition’ effects is a largely 
neglected, crucial issue.”  Regarding the priorities he advocates, I think the empiricism implied 
in the admonitions should be tied more closely to the policy changes he advocates.  If put to a 
vote, I think I would vote with Merrifield in favor of radical change.  My point, however, is that 
our theoretical priors must be driving these prescriptive policy views more than empirical 
evidence (see Berg, 2003, for an expanded argument on this point).  Economic theory suggests 
the possibility of pitfalls when moving toward a greater private role in the supply of school 
services.  Perhaps caution has prevailed too strongly in school reform analyses to date (e.g., 
Hanushek, 1994).  Hopefully, empirical evidence can be brought to bear that will assuage those 
concerns and provide insights to design school reform policy with more choice and with less risk 
of running into problems predicted by theory.  Acknowledging the six points I raised above 
regarding possibly unforeseen losses should strengthen future policy debates by tying them—to 
the maximum extent possible—to rigorous empirical analysis.   
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